

How Kissinger Did It

BEHIND THE VIETNAM CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

by Tad Szulc

For Americans, the long war is over. For many, it is something to be forgotten, buried, pushed aside. But for others, it is not. A number of recent books, as well as the Pentagon Papers, have shed light on how we got into the war and how we conducted it.

Much less is known, however, about how we got out. A cloak of secrecy mixed with ambiguity has covered much of Henry Kissinger's remarkable negotiations. Even the most careful observers, even people who participated in portions of the multifaceted negotiations themselves, had trouble following them over their long and tortuous course, which involved not only the North Vietnamese, but also the Russians, the Chinese, the South Vietnamese, and the U.S. government.

Tad Szulc presents here the most complete account yet assembled of the complicated events that culminated in the signing of the Paris cease-fire agreements in January of last year. He also goes further, concluding his article with an insight into the possibilities and pitfalls left by the agreements themselves, a subject made all the more relevant by the continuing debate over American assistance to the Indochinese states.

Some of the material that follows has been public for some time. The rest of it is based on new information pieced together by Szulc from a wide variety of sources in Washington, Paris, and elsewhere, in the course of research he is conducting for a major new book on the foreign policy of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger (to be published by The Viking Press late this year). His article—the longest we have ever published—provides an unprecedented insight into how American military disengagement